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A SANIST WILL?
PAMELA R. CHAMPINE*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Discrimination runs rampant through the law of wills. Although
the statute of wills1 purports to confer the right to determine disposition of one’s own property at death, subject to specified constraints, on
every individual who meets minimal qualifications, probate will constitute a significantly greater hurdle for those wills that eschew societal
expectations as opposed to those that embrace them.2 This discrimination against “abhorrent testators”3 pervades all major grounds for a
will contest: failure to comply with statutory formalities for will execution, undue influence, and lack of testamentary capacity. For that reason, some commentators address the discrimination problem on an
aggregate basis,4 while others analyze the problem within the context
of a single doctrine.5
Remarkably, there is a dearth of commentary focusing on this type
of discrimination in connection with the doctrine of testamentary capacity. The work of Professor Michael L. Perlin,6 which focuses on
* Associate Professor, New York Law School. B.S. Univ. of Illinois, 1985; J.D.
Northwestern Univ., 1988; L.L.M. New York Univ., 1990.
1. Unif. Probate Code § 2-502 (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. 144-145 (1998).
2. See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611
(1988); Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235 (1996).
For a discussion of this issue in the context of testamentary capacity specifically, see
Milton D. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise, 53 YALE L.
J. 271 (1943).
3. The term “abhorrent testator” was coined by E. Gary Spitko in E. Gary Spitko,
Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator From Majoritarian Cultural Norms
Through Minority Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275 (1995).
4. Id.; see also Aloysius A. Leopold & Gerry W. Beyer, Ante-Mortem Probate: A Viable
Alternative, 43 ARK. L. REV. 131 (1990).
5. See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U.
PITT. L. REV. 225 (1981); Edwin M. Epstein, Testamentary Capacity, Reasonableness and
Family Maintenance: A Proposal for Meaningful Reform, 35 TEMPLE L. Q. 231 (1962).
6. For a sampling of Professor Perlin’s work in this area, see MICHAEL L. PERLIN,
THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL (2000) [hereinafter PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE]; MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (2d
ed. 1998); Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth:” Sanism, Pretextuality,
and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEG. ISS. 3
547
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mental disability law, provides a novel framework for analyzing the specific problem of discrimination in cases involving allegations of testamentary incapacity. Rather than conceptualizing the problem as one
of discrimination against individuals whose dispositive preferences lie
outside societal norms, his work suggests that the problem may be conceptualized as one of “sanism,” irrational prejudice against or judgment about persons with mental disabilities.7
This essay considers whether the observed discrimination in the
application of the testamentary capacity doctrine may be explained as
a product of sanist prejudice rather than, as previously assumed, discrimination based on a dispositive plan. The essay first describes the
policy underlying the doctrine of testamentary capacity as well as the
doctrine itself as reflected in case law, and identifies aspects of both
policy and doctrine that may be considered sanist. The essay then discusses several beneficial corollaries to the reduction of sanism, including reduction of discrimination in testamentary validity based upon
failure to comport with societal norms; renewed focus on the extent to
which family protection is desired and desirable; potential enhancement of therapeutic consequences for testators and those involved in
will contests; and integration of ethical concerns faced by estate planning lawyers who serve clients of questionable capacity into the law of
testamentary capacity. In conclusion, this essay calls for a reevaluation
of the policy and doctrine of testamentary capacity in order to ameliorate sanism and to achieve these corollary benefits.
(1999) [hereinafter Perlin, Half-Wracked]; Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:
Understanding the Sanist and Pretextual Bases of Mental Disability Law, 20 N. ENG. J. CRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 369 (1994); Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The
Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625 (1993); Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism,” 46
S.M.U. L. REV. 373 (1992); Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and
Law: Of “Ordinary Common Sense,” Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL.
AM ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131 (1991).
7. Professor Perlin defines sanism as “an irrational prejudice of the same quality
and character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing
social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia and ethnic bigotry.” Perlin further
elaborates on sanism as follows:
[Sanism] infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices. Sanism is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable. It is based predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and deindividualization, and is
sustained and perpetuated by our use of alleged “ordinary common sense”
(OCS) and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to events both
in everyday life and in the legal process.
See generally Perlin, On “Sanism,” supra note 6 at 374-375.
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THE SANIST LENS

Perlin posits that courts rely on pretexts8 to achieve desired ends
which reflect sanist bias, and that this bias pervades all areas of mental
disability law.9 Sanist influence, in his view, explains the gap between
what mental disability law appears to be and what it actually is.10 If
Perlin is correct, sanism will explain, in whole or in part, the documented gulf between the ostensible doctrine of testamentary capacity
as articulated in the abstract and the results reached in actual cases
that is manifested in (what appears to be) discrimination based on the
dispositive plan.
A.

Signs of Sanism

The validity of an analysis extending the theoretical construct of
sanism from the areas of civil commitment and criminal law, in which
it was developed, to the law of wills, is not self-evident. The purpose of
imposing a competency or capacity requirement in areas of public law
relates, in large part, to protection of the individual himself and members of society at large from direly detrimental consequences of ill-conceived decisions or acts that individuals with the requisite capacity
would not or could not perform. The requirement of testamentary
capacity, in contrast, serves to preclude certain individuals from exercising a choice that those deemed to possess the requisite capacity may
and do enjoy, on the grounds that these individuals would not have
chosen as they did if they possessed the necessary level of
understanding.
The relevance of this distinction between the purpose of capacity
requirements in public law arenas and that of testamentary capacity
depends upon the reasons why sanism abounds in public law. Perlin
identifies historical, practical, and emotional reasons for this phenomenon. The historical reason relates to the inextricable link between
evil and mental illness which created a belief that those who lost their
capacity to reason were not entitled to the treatment accorded to
8. Professor Perlin defines “pretextuality” as implicit or explicit judicial acceptance of testimonial dishonesty and similarly dishonest decision-making, specifically
where witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a high propensity to purposely distort
their testimony in order to achieve desired ends. See PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra
note 6 at 60.
9. See Perlin, Half-Wracked, supra note 6 at 5.
10. Id. at 10.

R
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humans.11 The practical reason is that assessments of capacity are
complex, and therefore the temptation to rely on heuristics, “ordinary
common sense,”12 and other simplifying devices to address the issue is
hard to resist.13 The emotional reason is based upon individuals’ subconscious fear of contracting mental illness or declining in mental capacity themselves which incites virulence exceeding that associated
with immutable traits, such as race and gender, which also trigger
discrimination.14
The practical and historical explanations for the prevalence of
sanism apply with full force in the law of wills: assessing capacity is no
easier in the context of a will contest than it is in the context of a
criminal trial, and deeply held conceptions of personhood transcend
legal context. The emotional basis for sanism, one would expect,
would be context-dependent because the fear of mental illness or incapacity would be based in part upon the treatment accorded to individuals with that characteristic. If involuntary commitment is more
frightening than denial of testamentary freedom, as one would suspect
it is for most individuals, then this emotional force of sanist decisionmaking would be greater in the context of an involuntary commitment
proceeding than a will contest. For this reason, sanism may be less
pronounced in the law of wills than it is elsewhere, but this acknowledgment hardly undermines concern about its existence. Instead, it
simply highlights how the signs of sanism may vary from one context to
the next. The following examination of testamentary capacity in terms
of underlying policy as well as established case law reveals a sanist bias
in the law of wills that bears out Perlin’s assertion of sanism’s permeation of mental disability law.

11. See Perlin, On “Sanism,” supra note 6, at 388-397.
12. PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 6 at 13, citing Richard Sherwin, Dialects
and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729,
737 (1988); Richard Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and Plot: Belief and Suspicion in Legal Story
Telling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 543, 595 (1988) (defining “ordinary common sense” as a “prereflexive attitude exemplified by the attitude of ‘what I know is “self-evident;”’ it is what
‘everybody knows’”).
13. Perlin, On Sanism, supra note 6, at 388-397.
14. Id.

R
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Policy

Liberty and autonomy form the core of this country’s political
structure.15 The law imposes capacity requirements for acts of legal
significance, such as entering into contracts and exercising rights in
the criminal trial process, because the paternalistic desire to protect
incapacitated individuals from their own ill-considered acts, the desire
to protect society from the consequences of those acts, or both, outweigh the curtailment of individual autonomy.16 The existence of a
paternalistic concern is necessary to justify a capacity requirement, and
evaluation of its importance as compared to the value of autonomy is
essential to determine the nature and rigor of the requirement. The
context-specific nature of the determination explains why tests of capacity vary from area to area and issue to issue.
In the law of wills, there is a dearth of discussion or debate about
the purpose of the requirement of testamentary capacity.17 This stands
in marked contrast to the plentiful scholarship addressing other requisites for testamentary validity such as the requirement of execution formalities.18 The contrast is all the more striking in light of (i) the ease
15. See generally Bruce J. Winick, Integrating Legal and Psychological Perspectives in the
Right to Personal Autonomy, 37 NOVA L. REV. 1705 (1992).
16. See, e.g., George J. Alexander and Thomas S. Szasz, From Contract to Status via
Psychiatry, 13 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 537 (1973).
17. The notable exception is a series of articles written by Dean Green in the
1940’s. Green, supra note 2; Milton D. Green, The Operative Effect of Mental Incompetency
on Agreements and Wills, 21 TEX. L. REV. 554 (1943); Milton D. Green, Fraud, Undue
Influence and Mental Incompetency: A Study In Related Concepts, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 176
(1943); Milton D. Green, Judicial Tests of Mental Incompetency, 6 MO. L. REV. 141 (1941);
Milton D. Green, Public Policies Underlying the Law of Mental Incompetency, 38 MICH. L.
REV. 1189 (1940). This body of work, more than half a century old, remains the definitive authority on the issue of testamentary capacity. See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, The
Case Against Living Probate,78 MICH L. REV. 1066 (1980) (rejecting ant-mortem probate
in favor of abolishment of the doctrine of testamentary capacity); see also, Alexander M.
Meiklejohn, Contractual and Donative Capacity, 39 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 307 (19881989). For an alternative viewpoint, see Jane B. Baron, Empathy, Subjectivity and Testamentary Capacity, 24 San Diego L.Rev. 1043 (1987).
18. For a sampling of the scholarship relating to will execution formalities, see,
e.g., Lloyd Bonfield, Reforming the Requirements for Due Execution of Wills: Some Guidance
from the Past, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1893 (1996); James H. Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55
ALB. L. REV. 1009 (1992); Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism and Legislative
Reform: An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism — Part Two: Uniform Probate Code Section 2-503 and a Counterproposal, 43 FLA. L. REV. 599 (1991); John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the
Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1987).
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of avoiding execution formality problems by engaging a lawyer experienced in will drafting, (ii) the relative volume of case law addressing
the two issues,19 (iii) developments in social science that might shed
light on our understanding of capacity assessment,20 and (iv) the
probability that testamentary capacity litigation will increase as the
population ages.21 The lack of attention to the issue of testamentary
capacity, and its purpose in particular, exemplify the insensitivity to
sanism that courses through law and society as a whole.
The scholarship that does exist on this issue focuses primarily on
protection of decedents’ families as the justification for imposition of a
capacity requirement.22 If a will is denied probate (and there is no
valid prior will in existence), the intestacy scheme will govern distribution of the estate, which will provide for the property to pass to the
decedent’s closest relatives. Financial protection for decedents’ families is a supportable policy objective,23 but the policy applies with equal
force to all decedents regardless of the extent of the decedent’s mental
functioning. Accordingly, increasing the stringency of general restraints on testamentary freedom in favor of the family for testators as a
class could be justified. Use of the capacity requirement to achieve
familial protection, however, would be suspect because it would affect
only estates of those whose capacity is questionable. This would be
sanist unless there is some basis for the proposition that families of
testators whose mental capacity falls below the requisite threshold require more protection than do families of unquestionably competent
testators who disinherit family members intentionally.

19. The volume of reported cases addressing testamentary capacity is more than
double that of reported cases addressing formalities required for wills based upon a
search of Westlaw key numbers 21-55 for capacity and 108-125 for formalities in the
topic of Wills for the period 1996-2000.
20. See infra notes 46 to 48.
21. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: SPECIAL STUDIES 23-190, 65+ in the United States, U.S. Govt. Printing Office; available at http:www.census.gov/prod/a/pop/p23-190/p23-190.html (quantifying
the “elderly [65+] population explosion” as an increase from 30 million to 40 million
from 1988 to 2007, and up to 50 million within the following seven years).
22. See supra note 17.
23. See, e.g., Deborah A. Batts, I Didn’t Ask to Be Born, 41 HASTINGS L. J. 1197
(1990); Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
83 (1994); Ronald Chester, Should American Children Be Protected Against Disinheritance, 32
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 405 (1997); Epstein, supra note 5.
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Doctrine

The vagueness of the policy underlying the requirement of testamentary capacity is paralleled by an equally vague standard for evaluating capacity. The standard, which varies slightly from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, essentially requires the testator to understand the nature
and extent of his property, the persons who are the natural objects of
the testator’s bounty, and the disposition embodied in the will at the
moment he executes it.24 This test is subjective in the sense that it
focuses on the understanding of the particular testator in question and
requires knowledge commensurate with the complexity of his
situation.25
The test for capacity is decidedly non-sanist in the sense that it
focuses on the individual testator’s ability to understand the transaction at issue and does not, by its terms, invalidate the will of a person
who suffers from any particular mental disability or illness. Yet the subjectivity and vagueness of the standard allow for the exercise of tacit
discrimination which, as noted, has been observed.26 Although this
discrimination has been viewed as bias based on the content of wills’
dispositions, an examination of the evidentiary bases for testamentary
capacity determinations in light of the scholarship of sanism, and in
particular the signs of sanism identified by Perlin, reveal sanism at
work. These signs are evident in the use, misuse or non-use of each of
the major categories of evidence relied upon to establish testamentary
capacity or lack of it: the nature of the dispositive plan, expert testimony and lay testimony.
(a)

Dispositive Plan

Of the three categories of evidence, the content of the dispositive
plan is the single most important factor in predicting the outcome of
will contests.27 Plans that favor close family members over more distant relatives or unrelated beneficiaries are significantly more likely to
be admitted to probate than are wills that fail to comport with this
norm. Many view this as evidence of fact-finders’ desires to protect
surviving family members from unorthodox testamentary dispositions.28 Another view is that this phenomenon does not reflect a fam24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See, e.g., Peters v. Catt, 154 N.E.2d 280 (Ill. 1958).
See Green, Judicial Tests of Mental Incompetency, supra note 17.
See generally, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.

R
R
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ily preference per se, but rather a reciprocity norm pursuant to which
fact-finders implicitly give effect to implied, unenforceable promises of
testators to disappointed beneficiaries that created an expectation of
testamentary beneficence that was ultimately unfulfilled.29 Both of
these views focus on the outcome of will contests and attribute disparities to an intentional desire to conform the disposition of the estate at
issue to norms adopted by the finder of fact.
The sanist lens, in contrast, focuses on the means by which disparate outcomes are achieved. If the signs of sanism are present in the
analysis of the means, the sanist perspective would suggest that the basis of the disparity in the outcome of will contests lies in the equally
invidious but far less visible bias against individuals who exhibit signs of
mental disability. Of course, the testamentary capacity requirement is
designed to discriminate based upon mental capacity, and this discrimination is warranted to the extent that there is a justification for imposing a capacity requirement which the preceding policy discussion
suggests there may be. If, however, capacity determinations are based
upon stereotype, myth, or other irrational grounds, rather than coherent application of the articulated test, discrimination that appears to
be legitimate in fact becomes an exercise in sanism.
One sign of sanism is the use of alleged “ordinary common sense”
(“OCS”) in place of legitimate identifiable bases for determinations of
incapacity.30 Use of the dispositive scheme embodied in the will to
evaluate the validity of an exercise of testamentary freedom reflects an
application of OCS because the dispositions in the will, however unusual, do not themselves evidence the testator’s cognition. To evaluate
the validity of an exercise of testamentary freedom based upon how an
individual chooses to exercise that freedom is circular. This is not to
say that the dispositive scheme should be entirely irrelevant to the capacity inquiry, but its preeminence as the predictive factor in will contest results suggests an overuse that improperly subordinates the
influence of more directly relevant evidence.
(b)

Expert Testimony

In contrast to the importance of the dispositive scheme embodied
in a will subject to a capacity challenge, the value of expert testimony
29. See generally Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity, and
Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551 (1999).
30. PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 6, at 4.

R
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generally is negligible. This reflects a skepticism about the objectivity
of experts retained in a partisan battle as well as a sense that the science underlying the mental health professions is insufficiently precise
to merit consideration.31 This viewpoint parallels one of the sanist
myths identified by Perlin which holds that “[m]ental illness can be
easily identified by lay persons and matches up closely to popular media depictions. It comports with our common sense notion of crazy
behavior.”32 Eschewing medical and social science in this way creates a
vacuum in which OCS can flourish.33 Thus, this attitude about expert
testimony exacerbates the problem of overreliance on a will’s dispositive scheme as evidence of incapacity.
This is not to suggest that the standard for testamentary capacity
ought to be medical rather than legal, or that it would be appropriate
to base a determination about testamentary capacity upon a particular
medical diagnosis. Nor is this to assume that mental health professionals are immune from sanist thinking. Perlin expressly cautions that
sanist experts are central to the problem of sanism.34 If, however, the
basis for the opinion is probed and determined to be sound, expert
testimony, particularly from one who examined the testator near the
time of the will execution, often should carry significant weight.
(c)

Lay Testimony

The value accorded to lay testimony depends, in large part, upon
the underlying facts that form the basis of an opinion about capacity or
lack of it as well as the context in which the lay witness’ observations
occurred.35 Observations of the testator’s forgetfulness, confusion, undocumented suspicions, and other behavior consistent with declining
capacity often is relied upon to support a determination of incapacity
even when these observations occur in the context of casual exchanges
31. Willis J. Spaulding, Testamentary Competency: Reconciling Doctrine with the Role of
the Expert Witness, 9 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 113, 114 (1985) (“Courts long have disparaged the evidentiary value of expert opinion about testamentary competency, relative to
the value of lay opinion on the same issue.”). See also Meiklejohn, supra note 17, at 347
(1988-1989) (“Courts continue to assess capacity primarily by reference to lay testimony
of forgetfulness, confusion disorientation and erratic or improvident behavior.”).
32. See Perlin, On “Sanism,” supra note 6, at 395.
33. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law, supra note 6, at 670.
34. Id. at 629. ( “Experts often testify according to their own self-referential concepts of morality.”). See also, PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 6, at 10-11 (describing susceptibility of experts to heuristics contributing to sanist judicial determinations).
35. Meiklejohn, supra note 17.
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long before or after the will execution. Like the dispositive content of
the will, this evidence is not devoid of value, but overreliance on it
echoes the sanist myth that mental functioning can be easily identified
by lay persons.
B.

Remedying Sanism

Recognition of sanism is a necessary preliminary step to its eradication or reduction, but mere recognition does not itself ensure that
reform will follow. If Perlin’s work in areas of public law is any indication, the effort to counteract sanism in the law of wills will require
Herculean effort. A most important aspect of this effort is articulating
anew a policy justification for the doctrine of testamentary capacity
that is designed to attract widespread support by identifying benefits
apart from or ancillary to reduction of sanism per se. These benefits
could include some or all of the following: reducing discrimination
based upon the dispostive plan, focusing on the extent to which family
protection is desired and desirable, enhancing therapeutic consequences for testators and those involved in will contests, and confronting ethical concerns faced by estate planning lawyers who serve
clients of questionable capacity.
1.

Reducing Discrimination

The reduction of sanism will reduce commensurately discrimination based on the dispostive plan to the extent that it is the by-product
of “ordinary common sense” employed for lack of a cogent comprehension of testamentary capacity as opposed to a conscious effort to
discriminate against those who deviate from societal norms. The observation of this discrimination throughout the grounds for will contests, including execution formality, which could be applied
evenhandedly without the necessity of heuristics, suggests that there is
an element of intentional bias present in this discrimination. If this is
true, eradication of sanism is nevertheless, or perhaps particularly, important in the effort to reduce discrimination based upon the dispostive plan.
Coherence in the application of the doctrine of testamentary capacity would reduce the ability to rely on that doctrine to effectuate
unwarranted discrimination and consequently increase reliance on the
doctrine of undue influence to effectuate this purpose. That doctrine,
closely intertwined with testamentary capacity, establishes the invalidity
of a will executed by a competent testator if it reflects the wishes of
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someone other than the testator himself as a result of influence rising
to the level of “coercion produced by importunity, or by a silent resistless power which the strong will often exercises over the weak and infirm, and which could not be resisted, so that the motive was
tantamount to force or fear . . . . ”36 This doctrine is used in some
cases to invalidate wills of testators whose competency is questioned
but cannot, in the finder of fact’s view, be said to fall below the minimal level of capacity required to execute a valid will.37 Increased reliance on undue influence to effectuate unwarranted discrimination,
together with the optimism generated by successful revision of the doctrine of capacity, would rejuvenate interest in the considerable scholarship addressing the doctrine of undue influence which, in turn, could
lead to further inroads against the problem of discrimination based
upon the dispostive plan.38
2.

Focusing on Family Protection

As noted earlier, protection of testators’ families is the principal
justification for the capacity requirement in contemporary legal scholarship. While many have argued in favor of legislative change to provide this protection overtly,39 it also has been asserted that
manipulation of doctrine, including the standard for testamentary capacity, is an appropriate means of pursuing this policy.40 In light of
this extensive support for family protection, any doctrinal change that
36. In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Walthier, 159 N.E.2d 665, 668 (N.Y.
1959).
37. See Lawrence A. Frolik, The Strange Interplay of Testamentary Capacity and the Doctrine of Undue Influence: Are We Protecting Older Testators or Overriding Individual Preferences?, 24 J. OF LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 253 (2001). See also Estate of Szewzcyk, 2001 WL
456448 (Del. Ch. 2001) (establishing relationship between undue influence and capacity such that presence of factors tending to show motive and opportunity to exercise
undue influence shifts burden of proof on capacity from objectant to proponent).
38. For a sampling of the scholarship addressing undue influence, see Frolick
supra note 37; Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571 (1997);
Lawrence A. Frolik, The Biological Roots of the Undue Influence Doctrine: What’s Love Go to Do
With It? 57 PITT. L. REV. 841 (1996); Sherman, supra note 5.
39. See supra note 23.
40. See generally Ronald Chester, Less Law but More Justice?: Jury Trials and Mediation
as a Means of Resolving Will Contests, 37 DUQ. L. REV. 173 (1999) (arguing that, despite
the common law focus on the mind of the testator, the proper inquiry in will contests
should address the fairness of the resulting distribution). For a contrary view, see Josef
Athanas, The Pros and Cons of Jury Trials in Will Contests, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 529
(1990) (arguing that the “equitable fairness” juries may provide in resolution of wills
disputes should be supplied by legislative changes to laws that are “equitably unfair”).

R
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might undermine such protection must expressly identify and justify
this effect.
One facet of this issue that is worthy of exploration is the extent to
which support for family protection exists, either in general or in specific situations such as those involving minor or disabled children. The
discrimination based on the dispostive plan seems to suggest widespread support by jurors as well as courts, yet the absence of legislative
reform in this area raises the question of how extensive such support
actually is.
Another facet of the issue is the extent to which the policy articulated or perceived as family protection is more precisely providing assurance to testators that the presumed desire to provide for family
members will prevail notwithstanding execution of a will that expresses
a contrary intent which may be the product of mental impairment.
The difference between family protection per se and protection of a
presumed desire to benefit family members is important because the
first focuses on the claim of family members and the second focuses on
the effectuation of the testator’s intent. If the latter purpose justifies
the requirement of testamentary capacity, this raises the question of
the extent to which the law of wills is, or should be, designed to protect
testators from their own ill-conceived or mistaken decisions.
In general, the law of wills reflects a balance between the desire to
protect testators from the consequences of their own or their lawyers’
errors and the desire to protect testators as a group from erroneous
determinations about testamentary intent based on evidence extrinsic
to a validly executed will. In the context of doctrines other than capacity, such as construction, reformation, and enforcement of execution
formalities, this balance historically favored avoiding the possibility of
misinterpreting extrinsic evidence over attempting to effectuate the actual intent of individual testators who apparently erred. Recently, however, this balance has begun to shift in favor of effectuation of actual
intent of those who are alleged to have erred.41
In the context of the capacity doctrine, as the earlier discussion of
doctrine illustrated, the balance ostensibly favors protection of testators as a group over effectuation of the intent of an individual whose
41. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 (2001)
(rejecting historic prohibition against reformation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 (1998) (dispensing with execution formalities where there is
clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the instrument offered for
probate to constitute his will).
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dispositive scheme may have been ill-conceived due to mental shortcomings by establishing a lenient standard for capacity. Yet uneven
implementation of the standard in reality creates a more stringent barrier to probate which reflects a desire to insulate some subset of testators from the consequences of their decisions and increases the risk
that the will of a testator who in fact satisfied the test for capacity will
be denied probate.
The proper balance between protection of testators as a group
from the possibility of erroneous judicial determinations and effectuation of individual intent depends, in part, upon the ease of avoiding
the error that the doctrine addresses. For example, guarding against
execution of a will during a period of incapacity is much more difficult
than is assuring that execution formalities are satisfied. The more difficult it is for the testator to protect against the error, the more the
balance in the establishment of the parameters of the particular doctrine should favor effectuation of individual intent. This consideration
suggests that the balance between protection of the group and effectuation of individual intent will differ depending upon the particular
doctrine involved.
Transcending all areas of will doctrine is the question of the extent of the benefit of effectuating actual intent. One aspect of this
issue is the philosophical debate about the possibility of harm to the
dead,42 and in particular, whether a deceased testator whose will is denied probate suffers as a result. Another is the impact that corrective
doctrines, including the doctrine of testamentary capacity, have upon
the traditional justifications for conferring testamentary freedom: encouraging accumulation of wealth and fostering family care in old
age.43 If these purposes continue to justify testamentary freedom and
liberal application of corrective doctrines advances them, effectuation
of individual intent should weigh more heavily in the design of doctrine than should protection of testators as a group from the possibility
of judicial error in application of corrective doctrines. Conversely, if
the corrective doctrines have a negligible effect on the behavior testa42. See Barbara Baum Levenbook, Harming Someone After His Death, ETHICS 94
(1984); Joan C. Callahan, On Harming the Dead, ETHICS 341 (1987); Don Marquis, Harming the Dead, ETHICS 159 (1985).
43. See generally Stanley N. Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1877-1978); see also, Ronald Chester, Essay: Is
the Right to Devise Property Constitutionally Protected? – The Strange Case of Hodel v. Irving, 24
SW. U. L. REV. 1195 (1996); Daniel J. Kornstein, Inheritance: A Constitutional Right?, 36
RUTGERS L. REV. 741 (1984).
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mentary freedom is designed to motivate, protection of testators as a
group arguably should take precedence over effectuation of individual
intent.
These policy questions in the law of wills differ from those involved in other areas of law because they involve neither protection of
the testator himself from any loss of liberty or wealth nor protection of
the testator’s family or society generally from loss of anything to which
they were entitled. Balancing the loss of testamentary freedom against
the abstract harm, if any, to the testator, resulting from failure to effectuate his actual testamentary desires, together with his family’s loss of a
mere expectancy of inheritance, is quite different from the interests
considered in the development of capacity doctrine in the public law
arena as well as the law of contracts and other areas of private law in
which loss of pre-existing wealth may have a direct impact on the individual or other members of society. Accordingly, the analysis of the
policy underlying testamentary freedom requires unique
consideration.
3.

Enhancing Therapeutic Consequences

Revisiting the policy underlying the doctrine of testamentary capacity creates the opportunity to consider a relatively new perspective:
therapeutic jurisprudence. Therapeutic jurisprudence studies the role
of the law as a therapeutic agent, recognizing that substantive rules,
legal procedures, and lawyers’ roles may have either therapeutic or
anti-therapeutic consequences, and questions whether such rules, procedures and roles can or should be reshaped in order to enhance their
therapeutic potential.44 Normative in orientation, therapeutic jurisprudence seeks to promote therapeutic consequences and to reduce
anti-therapeutic consequences without championing therapeutic value
as a transcending norm to the exclusion of other values. In pursuit of
this goal, therapeutic jurisprudence relies upon the behavioral sciences to examine law’s impact on the mental and physical health of
the people it affects.45
Application of the therapeutic jurisprudence construct to the issue of testamentary capacity would require consideration of the therapeutic or anti-therapeutic impact of the imposition of a requirement of
44. See generally DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A
THERAPEUTIC AGENT (Carolina Academic Press ed. 1990); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J.
WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (Carolina Academic Press ed. 1991).
45. See generally BRUCE J. WINICK, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED (1997).
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testamentary capacity at all; the therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences of alternative approaches to assessing capacity; and the therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences of each alternative for
everyone affected by capacity determinations. The largely untapped
resource of social science insight would play a central role in this analysis. This type of analysis may raise unanswered, or perhaps unanswerable, empirical questions, but almost surely will focus attention on
existing social science or related data that may prove useful in the endeavor to develop a coherent policy of testamentary capacity.
One source of information is the work of Dr. Eric Cassell, a physician who has studied the effects of physical illness on individuals’
thinking with a view to changing doctors’ perspective from one which
focuses on the body to one that focuses on the person as a whole.46 In
a recent study, he concluded that the thinking of physically ill individuals differs markedly from the thinking of well patients. While he cautions that the study constitutes an insufficient basis upon which to
determine the effects of physical illness on testamentary capacity, it
does raise the possibility that the current assessments of testamentary
capacity fail to recognize the impact of physical illness on decisionmaking capabilities deemed essential for an effective exercise of testamentary freedom. At the least, this study helps to identify an important
issue. Accordingly, Dr. Cassell’s work merits further consideration.
Another source of information is the MacArthur Treatment Competency Study, a social science research project designed to develop a
reliable and valid information base concerning criminal and civil competency, which focuses on the extent to which decision making
processes of those suffering from a mental disability differ from those
without such impairments.47 The civil aspect of this study, which focused on the degree to which mental illness impairs healthcare treatment decision making competency, suggests that those with serious
mental illnesses, including schizophrenia, may reason more completely than would have been expected.48 Thus, just as Dr. Cassell’s
work suggests that the current approach to testamentary capacity may
overestimate the competence of physically ill individuals so does the
46.

Eric J. Cassell, M.D., et al., Impairment of Thinking in Sick Patients, in A SYMPOEFFECT OF ILLNESS AGING AND EMOTIONAL TRAUMA ON TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND TRANSMISSION OF PROPERTY (Apr. 28, 2000).
47. See Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: A Summary of the MacArthur Treatment Competence
Study and an Introduction to the Special Theme, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3 (1996).
48. See id. at 17.
SIUM ON THE
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MacArthur study suggest that the current approach to testamentary capacity, in application if not in doctrine, may underestimate the competence of mentally ill individuals to execute wills.
An intriguing idea is the possibility of adapting the measures of
capacity used in the MacArthur study for the purpose of developing
instruments to measure testamentary capacity. While the researchers
and commentators uniformly agree that this type of use, amounting to
construction of a “capacimeter,” would constitute a misguided application of the research results,49 their objections to this possibility may be
less significant in the context of testamentary capacity determinations
than they would be in the contexts in which the study and the commentators focused. Moreover, significant adaption, or use of the instrument as a preliminary device as opposed to a definitive barometer,
might address adequately the researchers’ and commentators’ concerns. This possibility merits additional consideration as well.
This preliminary discussion of therapeutic jurisprudence should
not suggest that therapeutic concerns should play a central, much less
exclusive, role in any revision of the policy or doctrine of testamentary
capacity. Therapeutic jurisprudence would define neither the relative
importance of therapeutic consequences generally as compared to
other values such as family protection nor would it define the relative
importance of the therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences to the
testator versus family members. Moreover, the potential for paternalism that inheres in the therapeutic jurisprudence approach may detract from the goal of securing autonomy that the law of wills generally
seeks to provide.50 Other identified and potential shortcomings of
therapeutic jurisprudence51 must be considered as well before a
change so fundamental as the one contemplated here is based upon it.
Notwithstanding these significant reservations, the largely unconsidered criterion of therapeutic value must be recognized as potentially
important in any reconstruction of the law of testamentary capacity.
49. Thomas Grisso, et al., The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study: II. Measures of
Abilities Related to Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 127, 170
(1995). See also, Marshall B. Kapp & Douglas Mossman, Measuring Decisional Capacity:
Cautions On the Construction of a ‘Capacimeter,’ 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 73 (1996);
Roesch et al, Conceptualizing and Assessing Competency to Stand Trial: Implications and Applications of the MacArthur Treatment Competence Model, 2 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 96 (1996).
50. John Petrila, Paternalism and the Unrealized Promise of Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 10 N.Y.L.SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 877, 891 (1993).
51. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to
Ponder, 1 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 193 (1995).
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Confronting Ethical Concerns

Yet another important benefit of curtailing sanism is the opportunity to coordinate, if not unify, substantive doctrine with the ethical
standards and concerns of estate planning lawyers who serve clients
they suspect may suffer from a mental impairment. The issue of the
lawyer’s ethical obligation in representation of such clients is receiving
increasing attention from practicing lawyers as well as scholars.52
Within the ethical realm, the conflict between paternalistic concern and respect for autonomy creates friction just as it does in the
analysis of policy underlying the substantive law. If a lawyer suspects
that a client’s capacity may fall below the requisite threshold, is it permissible or mandatory for the lawyer to undertake an assessment of
capacity? If it is, should the lawyer consult a mental heath professional? Does the lawyer’s obligation vary according to the length or
depth of the relationship with the client? Do the ethical obligations
differ where the choices expressed by the client are both inconsistent
with previously expressed wishes and, in the lawyer’s view, the product
of a mental disability that falls short of establishing testamentary incapacity? Neither the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct nor the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers
provides specific guidance for estate planning lawyers.53 While The
American College of Trust & Estate Counsel has published commentary on the Model Rules to supply this guidance,54 conflicting promulgations addressing the ethical issues arising from clients’ mental
impairments suggest that more attention is required.55
Overlapping with the ethical issue is the question of the extent to
which a lawyer who anticipates a will contest over capacity may or
should arrange for a pre-mortem expert determination. To what degree may the lawyer influence the expert? If the expert concludes that
52. See, e.g., Clifton B. Kruse, My Basement is Filled With Pornography! But – You Don’t
Have a Basement, 27 ACTEC J. 235 (2001); Robert B. Fleming & Rebecca C. Morgan,
Lawyers’ Ethical Dilemmas: A “Normal” Relationship When Representing Demented Clients and
Their Families, 35 GA. L. REV. 735 (2001); Jan Ellen Rein, Ethics and the Questionably Competent Client: What the Model Rules Say and Don’t Say, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 241 (1998).
53. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §24 (2000).
54. ACTEC Commentaries on the Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct, available at
http://www.actec.org/pubinfoArk/comm.
55. See generally Marita K. Marshall & Frayada L. Bruton, Has Your Client Lost Ethical
Considerations in Estate Planning, 35 A HECKLERING INST. ON ESTATE PLANNING at 5-22
(2001).
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the client lacks capacity, what is the lawyer to do? Does the risk of an
expert determination of incapacity justify or compel foregoing inquiry
if the lawyer is uncertain of the client’s capacity? Will an inquiry, even
if it ultimately proves satisfactory to the lawyer, prompt or support a
later challenge on the grounds of capacity? These and other related
questions require analysis that reflects ethical concerns of lawyers representing clients of questionable capacity as well as the post-mortem
impact of an inquiry on the client’s estate plan.
III.

CONCLUSION

Several impetuses, some longstanding and others more recent,
should prompt reevaluation of the policy underlying testamentary capacity and the resulting doctrine designed to effectuate it. The prism
of sanism as an explanation for the biased results of wills contests, the
tension between testamentary freedom and family protection, the insights of therapeutic jurisprudence together with developments in the
behavioral and medical sciences, and the discourse on related ethical
issues offer potential enlightenment for the reassessment of the law in
this area. To ignore the opportunity to use these sources of scholarship to reduce the irrationality of the current approach to testamentary capacity falls short of intentional discrimination against those who
exhibit signs of mental disability but it is just as reprehensible once the
signs of sanism in the law of wills have been recognized. To answer the
question posed in the introduction to this essay, there is no evidence of
an affirmative sanist will to discriminate against those who manifested
signs of mental disability during lifetime. If, however, the trusts and
estates community fails to consider opportunities to redress the irrationalities in this area, the label will be appropriate.

